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The Unpredictable Writ-The
Evolution of Habeas Corpus

Congress has provided access to federal courts for state and
federal prisioners who contest the constitutionality or legality of
their convictions.1 Section 2254 of Title 28 pertaining to state
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971) provides:
a. The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
b. prevents habeas consideration unless the state court remedies are
exhausted, unavailable, or existing circumstances render them ineffective to protect the prisoner rights.
c. requires the applicant to exhaust "any available procedure" within
the state.
d. states that any written factual determinations on the merits by the
state court shall be presumed correct unless:
1. the factual merits were not resolved,
2. the state factfinding procedure was not adequate for a full and
fair hearing,
3. all material facts were not fully developed in the state court,
4. the state court was without subject matter or personal jurisdiction,
5. the state court failed to appoint counsel for an indigent applicant,
6. the applicant did not actually have a full, fair and adequate
hearing,
7. a denial of due process occurred at the state hearing, or
8. the state court record pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the factual determination is missing and the
federal court concludes, after reviewing the whole record, that
the factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.
d. an evidentiary federal hearing is mandated at which the applicant
has the burden of proving "by convincing evidence" that the state
factual determination was wrong. However, if any of the 8 exceptions are proved by the applicant, or manifestly appear, or are
admitted by the respondent, this burden does not apply.
e. provides for the procedure whereby the state record shall be produced for the federal court and subsection
f. renders such records admissible in the federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1971) provides: "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
[federal court] claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the [sentencing court] to vacate, set aside,
or correct the sentence." This statute also allows the motion to be made at any
time and to be served on the United States attorney. Unless the motion is
patently without merit, a hearing must occur and if the motion is granted the

prisoners, clearly refers to this remedy as habeas corpus and
section 2255 has been construed as the statutory equivalent of
habeas corpus by the United States Supreme Court. 2 Basically
the remedy of habeas corpus is invoked whenever any prisoner

alleges that he is in custody in violation of the United States
Constitution or federal law.' However, section 2255, relating to
federal prisoners, specifies additional grounds for invoking
habeas corpus relief; imposition of excessive sentence, lack of
jurisdiction by the sentencing court, or sentencing which gives
rise to collateral attack.4 All of these grounds have traditionally
been construed very broadly in order to maximize the effectiveness of the "Great Writ." As Mr. Justice Fortas observed, "Its
province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all
rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument by
may be had into the legality of the detenwhich judical inquiry
5
tion of a person.
The constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution has been zealously enforced by requiring both state and federal courts to exclude all fruits of an
unlawful search and seizure.6 Because of the importance ascribed to the Fourth Amendment as evidenced by the extreme
judge shall vacate the judgment, discharge or resentence the prisoner, or grant a
new trial. The prisoner need not be produced at hearing and the federal court
need not entertain successive identical motions. Further, the ruling may be
appealed as a habeas application could and no other habeas corpus applications
shall be entertained unless this 2255 motion is shown to be adequate or ineffective. The effect of § 2255 was aptly stated in Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d
822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1966): "The extent of relief and review available on a § 2255
motion is the same as that open to a petitioner seeking vindication of his rights
by the habeas corpus route. The only difference is that Congress enacted § 2255
in the 1948 Judical Code in order to provide a less cumbersome remedy, through
consideration by the sentencing court rather than the district of confinement."
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 221 (1969), stated "Section 2255 revised
the procedure by which federal prisoners are to seek such relief but did not in
any respect cut back the scope of the writ."
2. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 14: "As we said just last Term, 'it
conclusively appears from the historic context in which §2255 was enacted that
the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy
exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas
corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.' " (Citing
from Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. Id.
5. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). See Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54 (1968). In accord is Fay v. Noia 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963) which elaborated
on the writ's historic position: "At the time the privilege of the writ was written
into the Federal Constitution it was settled that the writ lay to test any restraint
in this country was embodied in the
contrary to fundamental law, which ...
written Constitution."
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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sanction of exclusion applied to ensure its protection, it would
seem appropriate to afford all prisoners alleging violations of
that fundamental right the remedy of federal habeas corpus.
The provision of federal collateral remedies rests more fundamentally
upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights
requires the continuing availabilrelating to the criminal trial process
7
ity of a mechanism for relief.

Until recently it was well established that federal courts could
entertain habeas corpus applications by state prisoners who
alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. 8 However, that
rule has now been changed as a result of the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Stone v. Powell,9 joined with
Wolff v. Rice.'
Following Powell the rule is now

"...

that where the state

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.""
It is evident that this rule is a significant retreat from prior
interpretations of the "Great Writ's" broad scope; that it departs
from the sensible trend enunciated in Kaufman v. United
States;12 and that the analysis used minimizes the rationale
favoring use of federal courts as guardians of constitutional
rights. Further, this crucial decision sets an ominous precedent
for further erosions of federal habeas corpus power in defiance
of the legislative intent behind 28 U.S.C. sections 2254 and 2255.
Support for this thesis will be garnered from an examination
of the historical development of habeas corpus in the United
States, the significance of the Kaufman decision, and comparison between the Powell majority opinion, the Powell dissenting
opinion and the Kaufman analysis. Further, the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule will be compared to the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus remedy itself. Finally, poten7. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969).
8. "Our decisions leave no doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends
to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial." Id at 225.
9. 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3052.
12. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).

tial future developments and problems will be explored with
particular reference to questions left unanswered by Powell.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was initially conferred by
the Judiciary Act of 1789. Although not expressed in the Act, the
substantive scope of the writ was found to be governed by
common law principles. 3 Thus the federal courts could only
consider habeas corpus claims of federal prisoners. Further, the
inquiry was limited to reviewing the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 4 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,15 referred to by Mr.
Justice Powell as "the direct ancestor of contemporary habeas
corpus statutes,"'16 extended the remedy to all prisoners, federal
or state, who were incarcerated in violation of the United States
Constitution or federal statutes. However, prior to 1915 this
latter Act continued to be construed to limit inquiry to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 7
In Frank v. Mangum' 8 the Court abolished this jurisdictional
limitation holding that a court reviewing a habeas corpus application could inquire into the merits of the claim if the applicant
had not been given an opportunity in the state court to raise his
constitutional argument. The jurisdictional limitation was replaced with the test of whether the state had provided adequate
''corrective process" for comprehensive litigation of all federal
claims.
In 1953, with Brown v. Allen, 19 the "adequacy of corrective
process" review limitation was abandoned in favor of "actual
redetermination in federal court of state court rulings on a wide
variety of constitutional contentions". 20 Federal habeas corpus
power was thus extended to allow for a de novo review of any
state prisoner's claim. However, in a companion case, Daniels v.
13. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
14. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
15. "[T]he several courts of the United States ... within their respective
jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States.
...
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
16. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252 (1973).
17. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891);
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655
(1895); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906).
18. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
19. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
20. This was Mr. Justice Powell's observation in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
256.
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Allen,21 a new limitation appeared. In Daniels the petitioner had
failed to make a timely appeal and the Court held that this
procedural failure precluded a federal habeas review. Thus, a
legitimate state procedural bar would prevent collateral review
by the federal courts.
In 1963, with the decision in Fay v. Noia,22 this procedural
compliance limitation was abolished except in cases where the
petitioner had intentionally bypassed the required state procedures.23 Noia and two other defendants had been convicted of
murder solely on the basis of signed confessions. Noia failed to
appeal but his codefendants successfully established on their
state appeals that coercion rendered all of the confessions invalid. The Court affirmed a court of appeals' ruling and allowed
the federal court to entertain Noia's habeas corpus application
despite his failure to take a direct appeal. Observing that the
traditional purpose of the writ was ". . . to test any restraint
contrary to fundamental law.
.,"24 the Court in Fay held:
Obedient to this purpose, we have consistently held that federal court
jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not 25
defeated by anything that may occur in the state
court proceedings.

The new definition of the substantive scope of the writ was
more flexible: "Discretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge . . . 'dispose of the matter as law and justice
require' 28 U.S.C. § 2243.1126 In describing habeas corpus as a

remedy for "whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints
. . ." and the appropriate applicants as "persons whom society
has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little
enough compensation," 27 the Fay decision placed great emphasis on the equitable discretion of the judge hearing a habeas
corpus application. He was viewed as the most appropriate person to determine the propriety of the claim because "habeas
21. 344 U.S. 482 (1953).
22. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
23. Judge Wright, dissenting, referred to this test in Thornton v. United
States, 368 F.2d 822, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1966) as "...
the deliberate bypassing test
articulated in Noia.
24. 372 U.S. at 426.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 438.
27. Id. at 401-02, 441.

corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles . .. (and) among them is the principle that a
suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle
him to the relief he seeks."28
It became increasingly evident that instead of narrowing the
applicability of the writ, the Court was narrowly restricting the
circumstances under which a federal judge could refuse to hear
habeas corpus applications. Thus, the substantive scope of the
writ was broadened and the emerging trend was to increase the
use and effectiveness of the writ.
Did this broad scope of habeas corpus encompass a state
prisoner's claim of a Fourth Amendment violation? Or, as Mr.
Justice Powell asked when he addressed the "overriding issue"
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,29 what is "the extent to which
federal habeas corpus should be available to a state prisoner
seeking to exclude evidence from an allegedly unlawful search
and seizure? ' 30 Additionally, to what extent can federal collateral review attach to a search and seizure claim by a federal
prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
FOURTH AMENDMENT HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS

Prior to Kaufman v. United States,31 decided in 1969, there
was a split of authority among the federal circuits regarding the
availability of collateral relief to a federal prisoner asserting a
Fourth Amendment claim. The cases denying the applicability
of section 225532 to search and seizure claims applied the
rationale that there was a distinction between Fourth Amendment violations and Fifth or Sixth Amendment violations. The
latter violations were viewed as impugning the integrity of the
fact-finding process or giving rise to unreliable evidence whereas the former violations did not. It was argued that the exclusionary rule which protected Fourth Amendment rights was
meant only to deter violation of those rights by law enforcement
officials and not to cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence
secured once the rights had been violated. Since a Fourth
Amendment violation was deemed less serious than violations
of other constitutional rights, the extraordinary remedy of
28. Id. at 438.
29. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
30. 412 U.S. at 250.

31. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1960); Eisner v.
United States, 351 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366 (9th
Cir. 1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1963).
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habeas corpus was deemed inappropriate. However, some circuits were willing to allow relief based on Fourth Amendment
claims.
In United States v. Sutton 33 the appellant had been convicted
of federal alcohol violations in the district court, had failed to
perfect a timely appeal and sought to assert a search and seizure
violation in a section 2255 motion. The prosecutor contended
that Sutton's failure to exhause his direct appeal remedies
barred raising the issue in a section 2255 motion. 34 The appellate
court did not agree, recognizing a distinction between constitutional or jurisdictional defects on one side and ordinary trial
errors on the other. Reliance was placed on language from Hill
v. United States3 5 where a defendant attempted to assert a
violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in a section 2255 motion and was barred by a five to four decision:
It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not
a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarinconsistent with the rudimentary
riage of justice, nor an omission
36
demands of fair procedure.
37
Further support was derived from Sonnier v. United States
where a defendant, convicted of counterfeiting United States
Treasury checks, was prevented from asserting a defense of
non-execution of the checks in a section 2255 motion. The Sutton court recognized an implied affirmation of this constitutional/trial error dichotomy in Sonnier.38 Thus, the Sutton
court enunciated a workable method of applying section 2255 to
a claim of a fundamental or constitutional right and held that a
Fourth Amendment claim could be raised under section 2255:

In the instant case, the alleged error is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, which guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... We therefore reach the substantive legal issue, whether

upon evidence obtained in an unreasonable
the conviction was based
39
search and seizure.
33. 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963).
34. "Reliance is placed on the line of cases declaring the familar rule that
the provisions of this section [2255] may not be utilized to retry a criminal case or

to raise questions which were open on appeal from the judgment of conviction.
See, e.g., Sonnier v. United States, 314 F.2d 69, 70-71 (4th Cir. 1963)." Id. at 222.
35. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
36. Id. at 428.
37. 314 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1963).
38. 321 F.2d at 222.
39. Id. at 222-23.

Gaitan v. United States40 was another appellate decision
which supported the view that a Fourth Amendment violation
was so significant that it should be cognizable in a section 2255
proceeding. Gaitan was convicted of narcotics violations in federal court under the "silver platter" doctrine which allowed
fruits of a state's illegal search and seizure to be used by federal
authorities without violating the Fourth Amendment. Subsequently, the decision in Elkins v. United States4 disapproved
the silver platter doctrine and Gaitan attempted a second direct
appeal which was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Gaitan moved under section 2255 to vacate his conviction. The Court stated, "[we
have] consistently held that errors in the admission of evidence
must be reviewed on appeal and do not afford a basis for collateral attack. '42 Nonetheless, section 2255 was viewed as allowing
a "collateral inquiry into the validity of a conviction" 43 which
was available whenever the defendant's constitutional rights
had been denied. The court in Gaitan was confronted with the
question of whether the exclusionary rule itself was a constitutional right. In reviewing Mapp v. Ohio44 the court found ample

cause to rely on the reasoning that it was part and parcel of the
Fourth Amendment itself and to reject the theory that the exclusionary rule was a mere rule of evidence. 45 Thus,". . . we take it
that, under Mapp, the issue of the admissibility of illegally
seized evidence has a constitutional basis and, hence, the section
2255 remedy is available. ' 46 The sound reasoning advanced by
the Sutton and Gaitan cases favored extending section 2255 to
any federal prisoner asserting a good faith constitutional or
fundamental right.
In 1966, in Thornton v. United States,47 a different rule for
section 2255 relief to federal prisoners asserting Fourth Amendment violations was presented. The court of appeals had been
called upon to review the propriety of a federal prisoner's
search and seizure claim in a section 2255 motion. 48 Although
40.
41.
42.

317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963).
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
317 F.2d at 495.

43. Id.
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. "It is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 657. Also, see Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion where, after

comparing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he concluded that "a constitutional basis emerges for the exclusionary rule." Id. at 661.
46. 317 F.2d at 496.
47. 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
48. The defendant had been convicted of federal narcotics violations and
asserted both that there had been an illegal search and seizure of incriminating
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conceding that "the courts are called on to evolve and provide
procedures and remedies that are effective to vindicate constitutional rights" and ". . . the diligence and dynamism of the
federal courts have provided remedies to maximize protection
of these particular rights, 49 the court declined to extend section
2255 to search and seizure claims absent "special circumstances:"
We confirm that generally a claim by a federal prisoner that evidence
admitted at his trial was the fruit of an unconstitutional search or
seizure is not properly the ground of a collateral attack on his convicCollateral review is available, however, for the denial of a
tion ....
constitutional right accompanied by "weakness in the judicial process
which has resulted in the conviction,"50 such as lack of counsel, perjury
undiscovered, mob domination, etc.

The degree of weakness which must appear was not discussed
at length. 51 Save for a few examples, no workable standard was
enunciated whereby a federal trial court could uniformly extend habeas corpus to a federal prisoner with a Fourth Amendment claim. The Thornton court did go so far as to pronounce
which standard did not apply, refusing to find that the Sutton
constitutional/trial error dichotomy stood for, "a declaration
that a claimed violation of any constitutional right is subject to
collateral review under § 2255. ' ' The court observed that in
Sutton this dichotomy was qualified by the traditional habeas
corpus application to a fundamental defect causing complete
injustice or to an omission running contrary to basic demands
of fair procedure. Although a certain reliance on this traditional
standard was implied, little of the discussion was focused on
why the failure of lower courts to apply the exclusionary rule
would not be classified as a fundamental defect.5 3 Rather, the
Thornton court emphasized several practical considerations
papers and that he had been denied effective counsel. The latter claim was
found to be without merit and was not discussed by the court.
49. 368 F.2d at 826.
50. 368 F.2d at 824, 826.
51. "We do not undertake to consider what other 'exceptional circumstances' may warrant an evidentiary hearing in a collateral review based on
unreasonable search or seizure." Id. at 829.
52. 368 F.2d at 828.
53. The Court seemed to feel that eliminating certain constitutional claims
from the scope of § 2255 would increase its overall effectiveness: "The corollary,
however, is a contraction of the need for enlarging collateral review in order to
assure effective vindication of the constitutional interests involved." Id at 826.

tending to discourage the extension of section 2255 to search
and seizure claims of federal prisoners.
First was the problem of judicial administration. An increasing number of habeas corpus claims were flooding the courts
and it was feared that the mass of frivolous claims would obscure the few meritorious ones. However, this argument tended
to ignore the legitimate role of judges as initial determiners of
the merits of habeas corpus applications. "Discretion is implicit
in the statutory command that the judge . . . 'dispose of the
matter as law and justice require.' 28 U.S.C. § 2243. ' ' 54 Second,
the court addressed the question of "belated determinations;"
that is, the passage of time would tend to impair memories of
witnesses or perhaps add to their unavailability. In this vein, Mr.
Justice Fortas' observations on the long path faced by a habeas
corpus petitioner, even one released prior to habeas corpus
adjudication, seem relevant: "He should not be thwarted now
and [be] required to bear the consequences of assertedly unlawful conviction simply because the path has been so long that he
has served his sentence. 55 Finally, Thornton relied on the
rationale that collateral review would not significantly enhance
the purpose of the exclusionary rule, a point developed more
fully in Powell/Rice, infra. Relying on these points the Thornton court foreclosed collateral protection of the constitutional
right against unlawful searches and seizures, absent special
circumstances, for federal prisoners.
A parallel question concerned the status of a state prisoner's
Fourth Amendment claim in a section 2254 habeas corpus application. The Thornton court had proceeded on the assumption
that federal habeas corpus was undisputably available to a state
convict with a Fourth Amendment claim:
We assume for present purposes that federal habeas corpus will lie, at
least to some extent, to consider the claim of a state prisoner that he
was convicted
on the basis of the fruits of an unconstitutional search
56
and seizure.

Even the dissent in Thornton, viewing Fay v. Noia,5 7 proceeded
under this assumption:
But Noia, a habeas corpus case, leaves little room for this approach,
54. 372 U.S. at 438.
55. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,240 (1968). This case overruled Parker
v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960), which had held that expiration of a prisoner's
sentence while awaiting habeas corpus review rendered the habeas claim moot.
The Carafas court recognized that there were inevitable delays in court processes and in exhaustion of direct appeals which were mandatory.
56. 368 F.2d at 828.
57. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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and it has generally been assumed since then that, at least with respect
to state prisoners, federal collateral relief was available for all con58
stitutional deprivations. (emphasis added)

Further, the Thornton dissent observed that Linkletter v.

Walker, 59 dealing with whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied retroactively, rested on "the assumption that habeas
corpus was available for state prisoners' Fourth Amendment
claims." 60 Thornton recognized the trend of recent decisions to
afford state prisoners with meritorious constitutional claims the
opportunity to seek federal habeas relief under section 2254.61

Thornton stated that its decision concerning rights of federal
prisoners could be reconciled with Supreme Court decisions
62
which dealt with state prisoners' habeas corpus applications.
In Townsend v. Sain 63 the Warren Court was called upon to
grant a habeas corpus hearing based on the petitioner's allegations of illegal admission of a coerced confession. 64 The Court
discussed the need for an independent collateral review and
hearing of contested facts in a habeas corpus application:
It is the typical, not the rare, case in which constitutional claims turn
upon the resolution of contested factual issues. Thus, a narrow view of
the hearing power would totally subvert Congress' specific aim in
passing the Act of February 5, 1867, of affording state prisoners a
of claims of
forum in the federal trial courts for the6 determination
5
detention in violation of the Constitution.
58. 368 F.2d at 830-31. Cited in support of this proposition, and as an illustration of the wide spectrum of possible constitutional claims, were Dillon v.
Peters, 341 F.2d 337,339 (10th Cir. 1965); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965);
Hubbard v. Tinsley, 336 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. West v.
LaVallee, 335 F.2d 230 (2nd Cir. 1964); Nelson v. Hancock, 229 F. Supp. 132 (D.
Conn. 1964); United States ex rel. Holloway v. Reincke, 229 F.Supp. 132 (D.
Conn. 1964).
59. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
60. 368 F.2d at 831.
61. Id. at 829. Thornton also adopted the rationale of Fay for granting
Section 2254 relief: "There are substantial justifications, it is argued, such as the
limitations on direct review in the Supreme Court, to afford state criminal
defendants a meaningful federal forum..." Id.
62. "[Concerning Fay v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain], [w]e do not read
these cases as portending a change by which federal convictions would be laid
vulnerable to collateral attack." 368 F.2d at 828.
63. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
64. Townsend specifically dealt with the hearing provisions of 28 U.S.C.
2243 and its application to a petitioner who alleged coercion on his direct appeal,
a state habeas corpus attempt. The trial court denied a hearing on the merits but
the Warren Court ordered a hearing.
65. 372 U.S. at 312. As for which constitutional claims were cognizable:

The conclusion became inescapable that the overwhelming
trend was to extend federal collateral review to state prisoners'
constitutional claims. The decision in Kaufman v. United
States66 solidified that trend and reestablished the availability
of federal collateral review to federal prisoners.
67

KAUFMAN V. U.S.

The defendant in Kaufman had been convicted in federal
court of armed robbery and had exhausted his federal appeals.
Subsequently he moved to vacate his conviction under section
2255 on the basis that his sanity (a contested issue) had been
adjudicated based on inadmissible evidence illegally seized
from his automobile. Since both the district court and court of
appeals had relied on the line of cases barring collateral review
of Fourth Amendment claims under section 2255, and because
there was a split of authority as to the propriety of section 2255
applications in this situation, the Supreme Court was determined to define the substantive scope of the "Great Writ" and its
proper context.
The Court proceeded on the initial assumption that search
and seizure claims of state prisoners are cognizable through
federal habeas corpus: "Our decisions leave no doubt that the
federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against
them at trial."68 While it might be contended that this premise
was dictum because the issue at hand was the applicability of
section 2255 to a federal prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim,
the similarity of purpose between sections 2254 and 2255, leads
to the conclusion that this is highly persuasive as it is the cornerstone upon which the Kaufman decision rests. No contrary au"State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon proving that their detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person,
safeguarded against state action by the Federal Constitution." Id. This would
certainly appear broad enough to encompass a Fourth Amendment claim.
66. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 225. The Kaufman Court rested this thesis on solid ground. A
number of decisions were cited as examples of this rule successfully. Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (wherein the defendant asserted illegal seizures of
papers by state officials in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, after exhausting
his unsuccessful state appeals); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (where
petitioner was allowed to contest an illegal search and seizure in a federal
collateral proceeding despite the expiration of his sentence pending the habeas
hearing); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (where, although the Court
found no illegal search due to the exigent circumstances, the defendant was
allowed to contest his state robbery conviction on fourth amendment grounds in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding); and Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965).
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thority was referred to and subsequent decisions seem to adopt
this premise as controlling. 9 Particularly, Mr. Justice Powell's
observation in Schneckloth tends to bear out the theory that
section 2254 encompassed Fourth Amendment claims:
In short, on petition for habeas corpus or collateral review filed in a
federal district court, whether by state prisoners under § 2254 or
federal prisoners under § 2255, the present rule is that Fourth Amendment claims may be asserted and the exclusionary rule70 must be applied in precisely the same manner as on direct review.

It was thus incontrovertable that the high court believed that
the legislative intent of section 2254 was to encompass all major
constitutional or fundamental claims, including those arising
under the Fourth Amendment. As will be seen, this rule's deathknoll has been sounded in Powell/Rice.
Regarding the split of authority on federal prisoner habeas
corpus search and seizure claims the Court commented: "The
courts of appeals which have denied cognizance under § 2255 to
unconstitutional search and seizure claims have not generally
supplied reasons supporting their apparent departure from this
course of our decisions (i.e., the extension to Fourth Amendment claims)."' 7 1 Although acknowledging that section 2255
could not be used to appeal ordinary trial errors, the majority
asserted that it could serve as a means to appeal constitutional
claims, 72 unlike section 2254 which expressly required exhaustion of direct appeals prior to resort to habeas corpus. Thus
Kaufman implied that the reach of section 2255 was broader
than that of section 2252 because federal prisoners were granted
access without proving exhaustion of direct appeals as state
prisoners were required to do.
Kaufman rejected the government's theory that a Fourth
Amendment claim should be distinguished from other constitutional claims because the former, "does not impugn the integrity
of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently
69. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Whiteley v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560 (1971); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Dady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 U.S. 583 (1974).
70. 412 U.S. at 251.
71. 394 U.S. at 222.
72. The Court cited Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) and Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) in support of this proposition.

unreliable . . . . 3 Instead, the Court held that section 2255 relief
must be afforded to search and seizure claims, and in so doing
expressly rejected Thornton and7 4 its "special circumstances"
approach to this crucial question.
In Kaufman the government had conceded that federal
habeas corpus was available to state prisoner's search and seizure
claims but argued that the policies behind this rule, as enunciated in Fay v. Noia, did not apply to a federal prisoner's
claims. Those policies were based on 1) the inadequacy of state
procedures to raise and preserve federal claims, 2) the concern
that state judges may be unsympathetic to federally-created
rights, 3) the practical restraints on the high court's certiorari
review of a state prisoner's direct appeal, and 4) the necessity
that federal courts be the final arbiters of federal law. However,
the Court reasoned that these policy considerations were not
sufficiently unique to support the denial to federal prisoners
what was undoubtedly available to state prisoners:
Conceding this distinction, we are unable to understand why it should
lead us to restrict, completely or severely, access by federal prisoners
with illegal search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies,
75
while placing no similar restrictions on access by state prisoners.

Rather, the Kaufman Court enunciated other major policies
which amply supported extension of section 2255.
Thornton's emphasis on finality requirements was criticized
as being overshadowed by the congressional intent that prisoners retain a continuous avenue to air constitutional claims in the
federal courts. That is, ".

.

. full protection of their constitution-

al rights requires the availability of a mechanism for collateral
attack. 7 6 Evidently the Court reasoned that effective vindication of meritorious constitutional claims, the Fourth Amendment
included, was of far greater relative
importance than the exalta77
tion of principles of res judicata.
73. 394 U.S. at 224.
74. "We thus reject the rule announced in the majority opinion in Thornton
and adopt the reasoning of Judge Wright's dissent in that case..." Id. at 230.
Thornton's dissent rested on the rationale that 1) federal courts should have the
"last say" on federal law questions, 2) the difficulities encountered in determining whether the lower court ruled on the issue and full merits or conducted a
"full and fair" hearing under the Townsend standard, and 3) possible new law
or newly discovered facts on the subject prior to habeas corpus review.
75. Id. at 226.
76. Id. at 228.
77. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963): "The inapplicability
of res judicata to habeas, then, is inherent in the very role and function of the
writ." See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 423 where the Court recognized the
"familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings."
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Another policy considered was the maintenance of judicial
integrity. "The availability of post-conviction relief serves significantly to secure the integrity of proceedings at or before trial
and on appeal. '78 The federal courts being charged with the

protection of constitutional rights, this duty does not cease upon
the completion of the direct appeal. Rather, it was felt that the
federal courts are under an affirmative duty to review the trial
court's ruling under the same circumstances which enable state
prisoners to assert habeas corpus claims. With one exception,
the Kaufman Court adopted the circumstances announced in
Townsend v. Sain :79 1) if the factual merits were not resolved at
the trial level, 2) if the lower court determination was not supported by the record, 3) if newly discovered evidence is alleged,
4) if material facts were not adequately developed in the lower
court, or 5) if the lower court did not afford the defendant a "full
and fair fact hearing." The sixth category listed in Townsend,
whether the fact-finding procedure was adequate was held to be
inapplicable because of the presumption of adequacy of federal
procedures. 80 Thus, both state and federal constitutional habeas
corpus claims are made subject to the same scrutiny so that
judicial integrity can be uniformly maintained.
The Kaufman dissenting opinions generally advocated that
Thornton's "special circumstances" approach should be
adopted. They alluded to a number of reasons why the substantive scope of habeas corpus should be constricted as to both
state and federal prisoners, 81 among which were: diversion of
the limited federal judiciary at the cost of minimizing theories
of finality, the recent increase in habeas corpus applications
coinciding with this opportunity to narrow the writ's availability and the minimal benefits insuring to both society and the
defendant.
However, Mr. Justice Black's dissent regarding the exclusionary rule was most significant. He relied on the line of reasoning
78. 394 U.S. at 229.
79. Supra, note 63.
80. Incidentally, all six of these circumstances are substantially embodied
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971). See note 1 supra.
81. The dissent drew no distinction between § 2254 and § 2255 regarding the
elimination of Fourth Amendment habeas claims: "I agree with the Court's
conclusion that the scope of collateral attack is substantially the same in federal
habeas corpus cases which involve challenges to state convictions as it is in §
2255 cases which involve challenges to federal convictions." 394 U.S. at 233.

which held Fourth Amendment claims to be of a different
stature because they do not challenge the reliability or truth of
the evidence seized. Being concerned only with the manner in
which the challenged evidence had been obtained, such claims
were not believed to require the same habeas corpus protection
as other constitutional claims which focused on the very guilt or
innocence of the accused.
I would not let any criminal conviction become invulnerable to collateral attack where there is left remaining the probability or possibility
that constitutional commands related
to the integrity of the fact82
finding process have been violated.

Under Mr. Justice Black's guilt-innocence/trial error dichotomy
habeas corpus would be available only to those petitioners asserting constitutional claims bearing on their innocence. 83 This
dichotomy was later advocated by Mr. Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion in Scheckloth v. Bustamonte8 4 and became
a key rationale supporting the Court's holding in Powell. It is
interesting to note that in Kaufman's dissent Justice Harlan
joined by Justice Stuart disavow any support of this guiltinnocence/trial error dichotomy, stating "I must, however, disassociate myself from any implications. . . that the availability
of this collateral remedy turns on a petitioner's assertion that he
was in fact innocent, or on the substantiality of such an allegation." 85
A final argument advanced by the Kaufman dissenters for
not extending habeas corpus relief to allow a collateral review
of search and seizure claims was that such review would play no
role in deterring Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, there was
no compelling reason to allow habeas corpus to a defendant
contesting a failure to apply the exclusionary rule. No contrary
authority regarding other purposes of the exclusionary rule
were addressed.
Nonethelessp the Kaufman majority chose to follow the rational trend of extending federal habeas corpus to all meritoriclaims of fundamental or constitutional significance. This trend
was abruptly halted on July 6, 1976.
86
STONE V. POWELL/WOLFF v. RICE

On February 18, 1968 Lloyd Powell had been searched inci82. Id. at 241.

83. ". . ,I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind
of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt." Id at 242.
84. 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).

85. 394 U.S. at 242.
86. 96 S. Ct. 3037, hereinafter cited as Powell.
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dent to an arrest in Nevada for violation of a city vagrancy
statute. A pistol was seized during this search which connected
him with a California murder. At his murder trial in California
he contended that the vagrancy statute was unconstitutionaly
vague 7 thereby rendering the arrest and search illegal. However, the court of appeals affirmed his conviction,8 8 and the
California Supreme Court denied state habeas corpus relief.
The district court denied federal habeas corpus because the
Nevada officer had acted in good faith and because the admission of the evidence was deemed harmless. Subsequently the
federal court of appeals granted habeas corpus relief declaring
the statute unconstitutional,
the arrest void, and the resultant
89
search and seizure illegal.

In the companion case, Rice had been convicted of murder in
Nebraska on the basis of evidence seized from his house pursuant to a search warrant. Rice attacked the underlying affidavit for the warrant claiming that the magistrate had been
required to go beyond the fact of the affidavit and to incorporate supplementary information in direct contravention of the
rule announced in Aguilar v. Texas 90 and Spinelli v. United
States.9 1 The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the conviction on direct appeal and, oddly enough, referred to information
outside the affidavit in finding it valid. Rice subsequently proceeded under section 2254 for federal habeas corpus relief. The
district court, citing Spinelli and Aguilar, ruled that the affidavit was clearly insufficient to demonstrate probable cause
and thus the search warrant and resultant seizure were found to
have been illegal. The court of appeals affirmed the habeas
corpus relief on substantially the same grounds.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and joined the two
87. The Supreme Court had recently invalidated a substantially similar
vagrancy statute in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
88. The California Court of Appeal declined to address the legality of the
arrest and search because they deemed the error "harmless" under the standard
of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Incriminating testimony had been
received from a victim and from Powell's accomplices.
89. Although under these circumstances evidentiary exclusion would not
serve to deter law enforcement officers, it would serve to deter the legislature
from enacting unconstitutional statutes and thereby serve the public interest.
90. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
91. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

cases for hearing and determination. Mr. Justice Powell, writing
for a divided court, 92 expressed the Court's opinion that the
grant of federal habeas corpus relief was not constitutionally
required for a Fourth Amendment claim by a state prisoner who
had been provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claim in state court. In so ruling the Court reversed the developing trend solidified in Kaufman, gave rise to many unanswered
questions, and set a dangerous precedent with wide-ranging
ramifications for innumerable prisoners who had previously
relied on the Congressional designation of the federal courts as
vindicators of all constitutional rights.
PURPOSES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Inasmuch as Powell involved a plea for collateral application
of the exclusionary rule, the majority addressed the historical
development of the exclusionary rule. "Post-Mapp decisions
have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right.

'93

Rather, the rule is merely ".

.

. a judicially created

means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. '94 Thus, it was reasoned that it was within the Court's
discretion whether or not to apply the rule to collateral review.
Viewing the purpose of the exclusionary rule as primarily deterrence the Court determined that federal collateral application of the rule could be precluded without offending the Constitution. But is the exclusionary rule only a judicial remedy and
nothing more?
In a vigorous dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall stated
.. unlike the Court [we] consider that the exclusionary rule is
a constitutional ingredient of the Fourth Amendment ....

"95 In

so stating, Mr. Justice Brennan reaffirmed his position stated in
dissent in United States v. Calandra:
Rather, the exclusionary rule is "part and parcel of the Fourth
Amendment's limitation upon (government) encroachment of individual privacy".... The exclusionary rule is needed to make the Fourth
Amendment something real; a guarantee that does not carry with it
the exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a chimera. 96

The Powell majority achieves a significant down-play of the
92. Justices Powell, Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Burger (also concurring) were in the majority. Justices Brennan, Marshall and White dissented.
93. Powell at 5319.
94. Id. at 5318. The Court cited United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974); United States v. Peltier, 442 U.S. 531 (1975); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) in support of this premise.
95. Id. at 5333.
96. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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importance of the exclusionary rule lending credence to its decision by not ascribing a constitutional origin to the rule. However, an examination of Mapp indicates that the exclusionary
rule was intended as a fundamental right inherent in the Fourth
Amendment:
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to

all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was
logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrinean essential part of the right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In
short the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to
give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to 97grant
the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.

By not recognizing the rule as "an essential ingredient" of the
right of privacy and as a "constitutional privilege" the Court
erodes the force of Mapp and drifts toward Chief Justice Burger's often expressed goal, the complete elimination of the exclusionary rule. 98 This is particularly troubling in light of
Mapp's observations that the steadfast line of cases following
WolfP9 demonstrated that "the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions."' ° By not deeming the exclusionary rule a constitutional
right the Powell Court makes it much easier to ultimately deny
the writ which was intended primarily to redress constitutional
deprivations.
The Court recited two purposes for the exclusionary rule: 1) to
deter unlawful police conduct and 2) to preserve the integrity of
the judicial process. The majority terms this latter purpose a
"limited force"'' 1 and Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion terms it "fatally flawed"' 1 2 because of traditional restrictions on challenging the introduction of illegally seized evidence
at trial. Included within these restrictions are the fact that the
defendant himself must object to introduction, he must demon97. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961).
98. "Despite its avowed deterrent objective, proof is lacking that the exclusionary rule, a purely judge-created device based on 'hard cases,' serves the
purpose of deterrence." Powell at 5323 (Burger, C.J. concurring).
99. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
100. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655.
101. Powell at 5319.
102. Id. at 5323.

strate standing to object, he can be impeached by such evidence,
and he cannot object to grand jury review of such evidence. If
the integrity of the judicial process is so dependent on the exclusionary rule, the Powell majority questions why these traditional restrictions still apply.
Although the Court mentions Elkins v. United States 0 3 as
referring to judicial integrity, it does not fully raise and address
authorities in support of this justification for the exclusionary
rule. Elkins had cited Justice Brandeis' 1928 view regarding the
continued need for judicial integrity, and consequent respect:
"In a government of laws existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . . If the
government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
1 04
anarchy.'
This minimization of the role of the exclusionary rule in protecting judicial integrity is subject to criticism. Once a specific
defendant enters the trial process he is entitled to rely on that
judicial integrity and the traditional restrictions noted by the
majority can be reconciled with these requirements of justice.
The requirements of objection and standing by the defendant
only ensure that there is a person who may actually be injured
by a rupture in the judicial process. The use of tainted evidence
for impeachment can be justified by the equitable doctrine, "he
who seeks equity must do equity." Surely a defendant who
defies the judicial process by perjuring himself on the stand has
waived his right to demand that the rest of the proceeding observe judicial integrity by refusing admission of illegally-seized
evidence. Finally, the term "judicial integrity" implies the presence of the judiciary, something a grand jury proceeding cannot
claim. Thus, judicial integrity does not apply to the grand jury
as it does to a courtroom proceeding.
In truth, maintaining judicial integrity is a key justification
for requiring the exclusionary rule. The courts should be the
symbol of judicial integrity and, as such, should refuse to allow
the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. As was aptly stated in McNabb v. United States,10 5
"... a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a
flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has com103.
104.
ing).
105.

364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissent318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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manded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts
10 6
themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of the law."
Also illustrative of the importance properly ascribed to judicial
integrity is Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra,a case
which denied the rule's application to grand jury proceedings:
The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of
enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and of assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government would not profit from
its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermin7
ing popular trust in government."'

It should be quite clear that what the Powell Court summarily
dismissed as not being furthered by the rule, was actually its
key justification.1 1 8 By eliminating consideration of whether
federal collateral review was necessary to ensure judicial integrity in the state courts, the Court ensured support for its subsequent ruling.
The Powell Court did emphasize the importance of deterrence as a valid purpose of the rule. Two cases relied on by the
Court are worthy of comment. In Linkletter v. Walker'0 9 the
deterrent effect was considered heavily in denying retroactive
application of the rule but the Court also found that such an
application would not further ".

.

. the administration of justice

and the integrity of the judicial process." 0 In United States v.
Peltier,"' another case concerned, inter alia, with retroactivity
of the exclusionary rule, the Court spoke of "considerations of
106. Id. at 345.
107. 414 U.S. at 357.
108. Insight can be gained from the case that developed the rule: "The
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizure ... should find no sanction in the judgments
of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance
To sanction such proceedings would be to
of such fundamental rights ....
affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-94
(1914). In accord is Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968): "The rule also serves
another vital function-'the imperative of judicial integrity' [citing Elkins].
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to
lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions."
109. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
110. Id. at 637.
111. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).

either judicial integrity or deterrence of Fourth Amendment
violations ....,,112 This type of heavy emphasis on the deterrence aspect tends to fly in the face of the history of the rule:
This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a determination
whether its application in a particular type of proceeding furthers
deterrence of future police misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it is a purposeful rejection, of the history and purpose of
113
the rule.

Nevertheless, in Powell the Court centers on the deterrence
rationale and weighs the potential advancement of this policy
against the costs of providing habeas corpus review. The result

is the denial of collateral relief.
THE COST/BENEFIT BALANCE

In balancing the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule,
the Court relied essentially on those costs noted in Schneckloth
and considered by Kaufman, i.e., 1) effective utilization of a
limited judiciary, 2) necessity of finality, 3) minimization of

federal/state friction, and 4) maintenance of the constitutional
balance of federalism. 114 A further cost emphasized by the
Court was that the rule diverts the trial focus away from the key

issue of guilt or innocence, once again resurrecting the guiltinnocence/trial error dichotomy which had been rejected in
Kaufman. The Powell dissent responded that most of the costs
would have already occurred at trial and should not properly be

assessed to the process of collateral review. 115
The only benefit enunciated was the possible deterrence of
future violations of the Fourth Amendment. Conspicuously absent from mentioned benefits were those listed in Fay and addressed in Kaufman: 1) the legislative intent that federal courts
have the "last say" regarding federal law, 2) the inadequacy of

state procedures to raise and preserve federal claims, 3) the
potential that state judges may be unsympathetic to federally
created rights" 6 and 4) the practical restraints on the Court's
112. Id. at 538. Also enlightening is the conclusion of a case note on Peltier:
"It is the Court and not the police officer who permits illegally seized evidence to
be used against the defendant, and it is this principle that seems to have been
lost somewhere along the path from Mapp to Peltier." Note, U.S. v. Peltier-The
Good FaithBelief of the Policy Officer, 3 PEPPERDINE L.R. 386, 393 (1976).
1i3. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 (1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
114. 412 U.S. at 259.
115. Powell at 3060 n.10.
116. A striking example of this is Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 556 (1965)
where the trial judge responded to the defendant's contention that his Constitutional rights were being violated, that the case was "not being tried under the
Federal Constitution." See also Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 882, 889
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direct certiorari review. 117 Had these benefits also been weighed
it is certain that the Court would have had difficulty justifying
its "balance." As the Powell dissent notes, Fay, Brown, and
Kaufman represent ".

.

. reasoned decisions that those policies

were an insufficient justification for shutting the federal habeas
corpus door to litigants with federal constitutional claims in
light of such countervailing considerations.
FINALITY

It would seem that Fay and Kaufman had terminated the
practice of exalting finality of judgments over individual and
fundamental rights. As it was said in Sanders v. United
States:119 "Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no
place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.'

120

Perhaps the Court reasoned that

the cumulative effect of the lack of finality, coupled with the
other enumerated costs, would tip the balance in favor of their
ultimate result. However, this reasoning tends to foreclose collateral attack at the possible expense of violating due process
requirements. "Simply because detention so obtained is intolerable, the opportunity for redress, which presupposes the opportunity to be heard, to argue and present evidence, must never be
totally foreclosed."' 12' Furthermore, Congress undoubtedly intended to place federal courts in a supervisory capacity over
state courts regarding constitutional claims. 22 The Court does
not even pay lip-service to that legislative intent.
n.il (1966): "The Supreme Court may be concerned that other state judges,
though not saying so overtly, likewise fail to provide an understanding and
objective consideration of Federal constitutional claims." Note also, in Wolf v.
Rice, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), the Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to follow the
constitutional mandates of Spinelli and Aguilar, supra notes 90 and 91.
117. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 225-26.
118. Powell at 3064 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
119. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
120. Id. at 8.
121. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
122. "No binding weight is to be attached to the State determination. The
Congressional requirement is greater. The State Court cannot have the last say
when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed

fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right." Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953).

DIVERSION OF TRIAL

Focus

23

Inasmuch as the Court re-adopts the guilt-innocence/trial error dichotomy they put the very value of the fourth amendment
at issue. This, in turn, determines the propriety of applying
federal habeas corpus, an admittedly extraordinary remedy, to
Fourth Amendment claims:
Whether collateral attack is permissible depends on the nature of the
constitutional claim, the effectiveness of the direct remedies, and all
need for choices among competing considerations
in quest of the
124
ultimate goal of achievement of justice.

Can the value of any given constitutional right hinge on whether
it goes to the guilt or innocence of the defendant? There is no
historical support for this position. 125 As for modern precedent
the Powell dissent notes:
There is no foundation in the language or history of the habeas statutes for discriminating between types of constitutional transgressions, and efforts to relegate certain categories of claims to the status
of "second-class126rights" by excluding them from that jurisdiction have
been repulsed.

Enforcing such a dichotomy has the effect of revoking the
broad power granted to the federal courts by Congress to hear
all constitutional claims. The Powell decision does not provide
justification or support for the determination of a hierarchy of
constitutional rights. Instead, the Court has invaded the legislative province by developing its own measure of constitutional
stature.
In adopting this dichotomy the Court directly contravenes its
own rule as laid down in Kaufman;
Thus collateral relief contributes to the present vitality of all constitutional rights whether or not they bear on the integrity of the factfinding process. . . .The application of (the exclusionary rule) is not
made to turn on the existence of possibility of innocence .... 127

Ironically the Court does not overrule Kaufman, a point which
troubles the dissent. 128 In any case, the application of this
dichotomy of constitutional rights does not reduce the costs
weighed by the Court. As was observed in Thornton, ". . . finality is disturbed by enforcement of all constitutional rules, many
123. The dissent comments that the trial focus is bound to be diverted by
any constitutional claim that requires litigation. Powell at 3065 n.16).
124. Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d at 826.
125. "I am aware that history reveals no exact tie of the writ of habeas
corpus to a constitutional claim relating to innocence or guilt." Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 257 (Powell, J. concurring).
126. Powell at 3065 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
127. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 229.
128. Powell at 3063 n.14 states that Kaufman "obviously does not survive."
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of which apply regardless of the innocence or guilt of the accused." 12 9
Finally, a practical problem arises. There is a very fine line
between constitutional claims going to the question of guilt or
innocence and claims which supposedly impugn the reliability
of the evidence. As the dissent notes, a groundwork is being laid
for withdrawal of federal habeas corpus power for claims of
entrapment, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and invalid identification procedures. 13 0 Actually, the
list could be endless depending upon the composition of the
high court at any given time. It should be clear that such a state
system
of affairs is diametrically opposed to the non-priority
13
that the Constitution was intended to establish. 1
In its zeal to eliminate the abuses of "technicality" assertions
the Court tramples vindication of good faith constitutional
claims.
However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may
appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person,
the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of short-cut
2
methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness."

This same reasoning could brand the Court's habeas corpus
restriction as "a short-cut method." Evidently the Court is hopeful that the end will justify the means.
FEDERAL/STATE FRICTION

The Court's recognition of the need to minimize federal/state
friction is basically a reiteration of the concept adopted in
Elkins. "The very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon
the avoidance of needless conflict between the state and federal
courts.' ' 33 The Court indicates it is concerned lest the federal
129. Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d at 832 (Wright, J. dissenting).
130. Powell at 3062-63 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
131. "[The majority disregards] the ordering of priorities under the Constitution forged by the Framers and this Court's sworn duty is to uphold that
Constitution and not to frame its own." Id. at 5330 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
132. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). See also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): "To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminalwould bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court
should resolutely set its face."
133. 364 U.S. at 221.

habeas corpus power offend the state courts. As the dissent
observes, it appears to be much easier to adopt the ". . . seeming
premise that the rights recognized in Mapp somehow suddenly
1 4
This simevaporate after all direct appeals are exhausted."'
plistic approach regarding habeas application135is a misconception of the function of federal habeas corpus.
Certainly there must be a balancing of responsibility and
mutual respect between the federal and state courts. However,
there is a need for federal collateral review of state court decisions on constitutional claims. Federal habeas corpus provides
a much needed uniformity and stability to the mire which presently engulfs the Fourth Amendment. As Mapp noted:
"Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of
their now mutual obligation 3to6 respect the same fundamental
criteria in their approaches.'
There is a need for federal court supervision over state
courts. 137 As recognized in Fay v. Noia, Supreme Court certiorari is not adequate for this purpose. Furthermore, federal
court supervision is compatible with the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution for ". . . federal law is higher
than state law."'1 38 As the Powell dissent observes, state judges
are subject to election pressures, unlike federal judges, and they
may be influenced by political considerations in ruling on "technicalities."' 39 Additionally, addressing the expressed goal of the
majority to reinstill trust in state judges, the dissent argues
causes the abnegation of a duty expressly conferred on the
federal 140courts which demonstrates a mistrust for federal
judges.
134. Powell at 3061 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
135. "So also, the traditional characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as an original..' . civil remedy for the enforcement of the right to
personal liberty, rather than a stage of the state criminal proceedings
or as an appeal therefrom, emphasizes the independence of the federal
habeas proceedings from what has gone before." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 423-24 (1963).
136. 367 U.S. at 658.
137. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 269 (Powell, J. concurring).
138. Powell at 3067 (Brennan, J. dissenting) citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
at 510.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 5331. In accord is Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963)
which advocated the advantages of federal habeas over direct review: "The
language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all
make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary. . ..
The federal district judges are more intimately familiar with state criminal
justice, and with the trial of fact, than are we, and to their sound discretion must
be left in very large part the administration of federal habeas corpus."
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Actually the Powell decision itself may well place a strain on
federal/state relations. Throughout the opinion the majority
only addresses itself to search and seizure claims under section
2254. Although the dissent is quick to point out that the decision,
in effect, overrules both federal and state prisoner's access to
federal habeas corpus,' 4 ' the effect on section 2255 is not clear.
Conspicuously absent from the Powell majority decision is any
mention of this rule's applicability to federal prisoners' Fourth
Amendment claims. This invokes the delicate situation mentioned in the Thornton dissent:
It would be anomalous indeed, especially in light of the interest in
maintaining good federal-state relations, if defaults not precluding
one adequate federal review for the constitutional claims of state
prisoners precluded such a review for federal prisoners, or if defects
afrendering state court adjudications
42 inadequate did not similarly
fect federal court adjudications.

It could well be that by failing to address section 2255 the Court
has allowed one collateral route to remain open while closing
another.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Perhaps the best solution for the Court would have been to
wait for Congress to restrict the scope of the remedy that it had
so broadly fashioned. The Powell dissent makes a very convincing argument based on the statutory language itself. The admission of illegally seized evidence is a violation of the Constitution
under Mapp. This constitutional violation does not die with
direct appeal, but, rather, exists until rectified. Unless the constitutional error is harmless under the standard of Chapman v.
California,43 the defendant is "in custody in violation of the
Constitution" as expressed in section 2254 and is entitled to
federal habeas corpus relief. Unless and until Congress restricts
the permissible application of section 2254 the Court is bound to
interpret the habeas corpus statute according to the expressed
legislative intent. The dissent notes that "subsequent congressional efforts to amend those jurisdictional statutes to effectuate the result my Brethren accomplish by judicial fiat have
consistently proved unsuccessful."' 4 4 In its haste to cut back on
141.
142.
143.
144.

Powell at 3058 n.5.
368 F.2d at 831.
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Powell at 3068 (Brennan, J. dissenting).

habeas
applications the Court has invaded the legislative prov45
1

ince.

A more appropriate solution to the problem caused by the
volume of applications would be to adopt the "abuse of remedy"
146
or "abuse of writ" approach of Wong Doo v. United States.
Under this approach each habeas corpus application would be
disposed of according to sound judicial discretion and, if the
government could prove that a particular defendant was abusing the writ or asserting a frivolous claim, the court could reject
the writ. This approach, essentially a return to Fay's discretion
standard, would prevent dilatory tactics. When a valid claim has
not been raised initially a presumption would arise that the
default entailed an abuse of remedy. However, the petitioner
would be able to rebut the presumption by proving his default
was excusable. The key is that burden would rest with him only
if the above-mentioned presumption was invoked. If Powell is
followed the burden will always rest with the defendant to show
lack of a full and fair litigation of his claim in the lower court
whereas under Wong Doo the government would typically sustain the initial burden of proof. 1 47 It seems that the ends of
justice would thus be better served by requiring the party seeking to bar habeas corpus relief to show its impropriety in a given
case.
FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS

One major problem the dissent in Powell foresees is the
dilemma faced by those innumerable defendants who had requested federal courts intervention on a search and seizure
issue only to have that court temporarily abstain from entertaining their Fourth Amendment claims pending a state court
hearing. These federal courts are now unable to offer a forum to
those petitioners who had relied on their ultimate availability. 148
One certain future effect is a drastic cut-back on other
145. Such a judicial invasion of the legislative province could have drastic
constitutional effects: "Moreover, if construed to derogate from the traditional
liberality of the writ of habeas corpus . . . § 2254 might raise serious constitutional questions." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) citing Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963). Sanders (further cites U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2:
"The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 373
U.S. at 12 n.6.

146. 265 U.S. 239 (1924). The defendant had deliberately withheld an available second ground for relief while pursuing the first. His action was deemed
inequitable and relief was denied.
147. "[It rests with this Government to make that claim [abuse of writ] with
clarity and particularity in its return to the order to show cause." 334 U.S. at 292.
148. Powell at 3060-61, n.10.
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grounds for invoking habeas corpus relief. In the same term as
Powell, in United States v. MacCollom,4 9 the Court held that
denial of a free appellate transcript to an indigent defendant is
not a proper ground for habeas corpus relief under section 2255.
50
Also decided in the same term was Francis v. Henderson1
wherein the Court held that a challenge as to the unconstitutional composition of a grand jury was not cognizable under
section 2254 absent a strong showing of actual prejudice. In
Francis it was further held that defendant's failure to raise the
issue before trial barred him from raising it in a collateral attack. Evidently the Court is returning to the position that a
legitimate state procedural bar will preclude federal collateral
review.

151

Finally, the exclusionary rule itself can be expected to be
further eroded. In United States v. Janis5 2 the Court held that
the rule should not be applied to a tax case in which a defective
affidavit led to the illegal seizure of defendant's records and, in
turn, to a tax levy which he sought to avoid. Such continued
erosion of the exclusionary rule brings to mind Mr. Justice
Brennan's warning in Calandra:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "closed the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness" in violation of Fourth Amendment rights .... The door is again ajar. As a
consequence, I am left with the uneasy feeling that today's decision
may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still further and abandon altogether the
exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases .... 153
CONCLUSION

It is evident that Powell signals the Burger Court's design to
decrease the availability of federal forums for state defendants.
It represents a glaring insensitivity to legitimate claims of violations of constitutional rights. This is a dangerous trend for it is
the courts who are charged with enforcing the Constitution. "It
is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional
149. 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976).
150. 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976).
151. Recognition of a state procedural bar is directly contrary to Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
152. 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
153. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J. dissenting).

rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon." 154 That duty has been conspicuously breached in this
case.

BRIAN WADE UHL
154.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).

